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finally come to an end and a new
era in neuroscience will begin.
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A recent study has shown that illusory inversion of temporal order can be
induced by the ‘intentional binding’ of an action with its consequence,
and that this is associated with increased activation in a brain area
implicated in conflict monitoring.Elizabeth Liddle1
and Stephen R. Jackson2
Most actions require precise
timing: for example, we calibrate
our sensorimotor system in such
a way that the end point of an
action occurs at the timewe intend.
This is true for the tennis player or
musician and was likely true for our
hunting ancestors — the salient
moment is not when we initiate an
action, or even when the motor
action itself is completed, but the
time at which its goal is achieved.
Changing circumstances,
however, require that this system
be continuously recalibrated so as
to provide an accurate estimate of
sensorimotor delays. For instance,
different materials, lighting
conditions or acoustic
environments will each modulate
the time that elapses between
the initiation of an action and the
arrival of sensory feedback.
Moreover, the brain must be
selective about what, from
a barrage of sensory input, is
worthy of further investigation,
and one such filter is likely to
involve the computation of
a ‘forward sensory model’ that
provides an estimate of the sensory
consequences of our own actions
[1,2]. If this estimate is confirmed
by afferent sensory information,then we need not spend additional
resources on further processing.
But if there is a mismatch between
the model’s prediction and afferent
sensory information, then we may
be alerted to investigate further [3].
Stetson et al. [4] recently
investigated the effect of the
‘intentional binding’ of an action to
a consequent stimulus on the
perception of temporal order.
Haggard et al. [5] had earlier shown
that, as an action and its apparent
result become causally bound, the
time period perceived to elapse
between the two events is
compressed: intention and goal
appear to become one. In contrast,
arbitrary pairings of action and
stimulus produce no such
temporal compression. Intentional
binding would seem, therefore,
to involve the temporal elision of
action and goal.
While it is relatively easy to see
how such elision might arise from
processes that prioritise the
temporal precision of the endpoint
of action, it is less obvious how
such elision might be represented
neurally. One model of this process
might be that the intention to act
‘resets’ a single ‘clock’, bringing
the representation of the action
into temporal alignment with the
representation of its result. An
alternative model might be that thisrecalibrated timeline is maintained
alongside a ‘baseline’ timeframe
representing a more veridical
sequence of events.
Stetson et al. [4] sought to
quantify the magnitude of temporal
sensorimotor recalibration
observed in a simple motor
learning task, and to determine,
using functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI), whether
the brain activation associatedwith
sensorimotor recalibration
supported the hypothesis of
a single ‘clock’ that was
recalibrated, or whether it favoured
the existence of multiple time
estimates. The authors asked
participants to make a key-press
following a cue, under two
conditions (Figure 1).
In a baseline condition, for the
majority of trials, a brief visual
stimulus (‘flash’) was presented
very shortly after the key-press; in
a second condition, an additional
interval of 100 milliseconds was
‘injected’ between the response
and the flash. In both conditions,
in the remaining minority of trials,
the flash occurred randomly.
Participants were asked to report
which had occurred first: their
key-press, or the flash. From their
responses, the authors computed
the ‘point of subjective
simultaneity’ — the point in time
at which each participant
experienced the flash occurring
at the same time as the key
press — for each condition.
In the baseline condition, the
point of subjective simultaneity
tended to be at around the time at
which most of the flashes were
presented. In other words,
participants appeared to assume
Dispatch
R995that their own action was
‘completed’ at around the time at
which, in most trials, the flash
appeared. In the ‘injected delay’
condition, however, the point of
subjective simultaneity was, on
average, also delayed, not by the
full 100 milliseconds but by
a substantial proportion of that
interval.
This finding indicates that
participants recalibrated the
timeline of events in the ‘injected
delay’ condition in such a way that
their perception of time between
their actual response and the
expected consequence of that
response was compressed but not
eliminated. Interestingly, when
longer delays were ‘injected’, the
magnitude of the recalibration was
reduced, suggesting that, as the
probability of a direct causal link
between response and flash was
stretched, intentional binding was
attenuated.
Of greatest interest, however, is
the finding from the fMRI data.
Stetson et al. [4] postulated that, if
the sensorimotor recalibration
involved a comparison between
a ‘baseline’ timeline and a
conflicting recalibrated one, brain
activity in anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC), an area associated with
conflict monitoring [6], should be
observed. Such activation would
be less likely were the recalibration
process simply to involve the
resetting of a single ‘clock’. They
therefore contrasted the fMRI
BOLD signal associated with trials
in which the participant illusorily
perceived the flash as having
occurred before the response, with
that associated with trial types in
which the perception was veridical.
These were, firstly, trials in which
the flash was presented in the
same time window but after the
response, and, secondly, trials in
which the flash was actually
presented before the response.
In both contrasts, significantly
greater activity was observed
in an area of anterior cingulate
and medial frontal cortex
corresponding to that implicated
in conflict monitoring.
This result is of immense interest,
as questions remain as to whether
ACC activation is specific to error
monitoring or to a more general
monitoring of conflict [6,7]. In thisCUE
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Figure 1. The experimental paradigm used by Stetson et al. [4] (not to scale).
The participant makes a key-press following a cue. On 60% of trials, a flash follows the
key-press by a fixed time interval; on the remaining trials, the flash is randomly pre-
sented either earlier or later. In the ‘baseline’ condition (upper part of the figure), the
fixed time interval for the 60% of trials is 35 milliseconds after the key-press, while
in the ‘injected delay’ condition (lower part of the figure), the fixed time interval is in-
creased by 100 ms. Participants are asked to report whether the flash occurred before
or after their key-press, and from their responses, their ‘point of subjective simultane-
ity’ (PSS) is computed (grey arrow); flashes presented before the PSS are perceived as
having occurred ‘before’ the key-press (shown as dotted arrows); flashes presented af-
ter the PSS are reported as having occurred after the key-press (solid arrows). In the
baseline condition, the PSS was only slightly delayed, and most flashes were reported
veridically. In the ‘injected delay’ condition, the PSS was substantially delayed, result-
ing in an illusory reversal of temporal order for many trials. Trials in which this illusion
was perceived were associated with increased activation in a brain area associated
with conflict monitoring.experiment, ACC activation was
indeed associated with an illusory,
and thus ‘erroneous’, percept of
temporal order, although there was
no reason to suppose that the
participants had any subjective
experience of error. The finding
therefore suggests that the ACC is
implicated, not only in monitoring
conflict of which the participant is
aware, but in the production of
illusions subjectively perceived to
be correct. In particular, it suggests
ACC involvement in processes by
which conflicting representations
of temporal order arising from
sensorimotor recalibration are
resolved.
Questions then arise as to the
role of the ACC in this process. One
possibility is that the ACC serves to
maintain the neural activity
representing alternative modelsuntil further processing leads to
resolution [8]. If so, the findings of
Stetson et al. [4] suggest that these
alternative representations can
include dual representations of
time arising from the temporal
motor-sensory recalibration
associatedwith intentional binding,
and that the solution may emerge
as an illusory Bayesian posterior
resulting from a baseline prior and
a recalibrated likelihood [9].
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Epigenomics encompasses
genome-wide analyses of the
growing list of epigenetic
phenomena — such as DNA
methylation, chromosome
inactivation, non-Mendelian
inheritance and programmed
genome rearrangements
[1–5] — that are found across
the tree of life. One of these
phenomena, programmed
genome rearrangements, is
central to the recently completed
genome sequence from the
somatic macronucleus of the
ciliate Tetrahymena thermophila
[6]. The epigenetic processes
that generate ciliate macronuclei
have parallels at both small and
large scales across the
eukaryotic tree of life (reviewed
in [7]).
In contrast to many of the
other ‘omics’ — proteomics,
transcriptomics, metabolomics
and so forth — epigenomics does
not simply enhance genome
sciences, but instead challenges
the concept of the linearity
between genome and phenotype
(Figure 1). Definitions of
epigenetics vary in the literature
and range from Waddington’s
original description of the complex
development of embryos (in
contrast to preformationism) [8], to
current usage such as ‘‘the
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coded in DNA sequences from
cell to daughter cell or from
generation to generation’’ [9]. In
all cases, epigenetics enables
a single genome to give rise to
multiple phenotypes because of
processes that are not simply
encoded within the DNA
sequence of the genome. Our
growing appreciation of the role
of epigenomics is evidenced by
the dramatic increase in use of
the term in recent literature
(Figure 2).
Ciliate genomes are shaped
by epigenetic processes. Like
animals, ciliates have two distinct
genomes: the germline
micronucleus and the somatic
macronucleus. In ciliates,
however, both of these types of
nuclei are contained within
a single cell, rather than being
sequestered into specific tissue
types. The generation of the
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Figure 1. Epigenomics adds
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is driven, at least in part, by
a genome-scanning process in
which an RNA interference-based
mechanism ‘scans’ the zygotic
nucleus and the parental
macronucleus to shape the
newly developing macronucleus
[10]. In T. thermophila, this
processing is relatively limited,
yieldingw225 chromosomes
in the somatic macronucleus
from five canonical eukaryotic
chromosomes in the
micronucleus [6,11]. In other
ciliate lineages, this epigenetic
processing is more extensive
and can generate a macronucleus
withw25,000,000 gene-sized
‘chromosomes’ [12,13].
Analysis of the complete
T. thermophila macronuclear
genome sequence provides
further evidence of genome
scanning, as there is no evidence
of any transposable elements in
the macronucleus, even though
transposable elements are found
in available fragments of
micronuclear DNA [6]. This
suggests that genome scanning
has removed foreign DNA that is
present in the T. thermophila
germline micronucleus. Full
appreciation of the role of
genome scanning in ciliates will
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